



"Who fired the first shot?"
Berlin Crisis 1961

NOTE: This scenario requires the modified Berlin Crisis 1961.exe (included in the zipped file) to work properly. Also, back-up the Borders.bmp, Numbers.bmp, and Tiles_road.bmp files in your \TOAW-CW\Graphics subdirectory and replace them with the equivalent .bmp files included in the zipped file.

Date: 13 August 1961
Location: Central Europe
Map Scale: 15km per hex
Time Scale: One-Day Turns
Unit Scale: Regiment/Brigade/Division
Length: 60 Turns

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Of the many disputes that occurred during the Cold War, few brought NATO and the Warsaw Pact as close to real military confrontation as the Berlin crisis of 1958-1962. Any number of false moves, on either side, could have touched off a shooting war on several occasions during that tension-filled period.

This scenario attempts to simulate the strategic and operational levels in a potential outbreak of hostilities between the two great alliances during a particularly sensitive phase of the Berlin Crisis. Construction of the Berlin Wall by East German authorities (12-13 August 1961) marked the beginning of this period. As over 65,000 Soviet and East German troops surrounded the approximately 8,000

American, British and French military personnel in Berlin, tensions rose dramatically.

In response, U.S. President John F. Kennedy eventually decided to reinforce the Berlin garrison, demonstrating Allied resolve to maintain their access rights to West Berlin. On 20 August 1961, 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Division, sent 1,500 troops to Berlin along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn with orders to use force if their passage was blocked. All NATO forces in Europe were placed on full war alert.

Historically, the Soviets allowed the U.S. Battle Group through to West Berlin and we all lived to tell the tale. Instead, what if the Soviets misinterpreted an Allied probe as the leading elements of an invasion force and barred its passage, or launched a counter-attack?

PLAYER'S NOTES

Most NATO intelligence estimates from the period considered the likelihood of a deliberate Soviet attack on Western Europe to be very low. However, some considered "the most likely circumstance leading to the initiation of hostilities in Europe [to be] Soviet miscalculation, following a period of increasing tension." (1) This scenario models such a lead-up to general war, with a Cease Fire in effect on Turn 1 and a series of events, some combination of which will result in an Open Fire event. Neither side can unilaterally trigger the Open Fire event. Both players should pay close attention to certain events, as they will increase the probability of general war breaking out.

Many NATO and Warsaw Pact formations begin the game in "Garrison" status, with relatively low readiness, supply, and equipment levels. These formations will switch to their war-time orders (Defend, Attack, Screen, Secure, etc.) in response to alert/mobilization orders from their respective higher commands (the secret nature of which is modeled by "news-less" events). Bringing forces to alert status (NATO) or initiating mobilization (Soviets) has several side effects, namely:

- Starting mobilization/reinforcement timetables (this is irreversible),
- Progressively increasing Theater recon levels (from initially low levels - this simulates deployment of additional reconnaissance assets),
- Gradually increasing rail, air, and sea transport as well as supply levels,
- Further increasing tension, thereby increasing the likelihood that an Open Fire event will occur.

A key event, which will occur sometime in the first 7 turns, is the dispatch of an Allied access probe to West Berlin. Soviet reaction to this probe and NATO counter-reaction could lead to rapid escalation and the outbreak of hostilities. Note that since ACOW puts players in the role of Theater Commanders (thanks to José Maria Serrano for reminding

me of this point), they will have no quantifiable influence over the largely political sequence of events leading to the Open Fire trigger.

"SPECIAL WEAPONS"

Use of nuclear weapons by both sides is virtually inevitable in this scenario. According to Soviet military doctrine of the time, nuclear and chemical weapons would have been used from the outset of general war in a massive, coordinated strike. (3) (4) In the words of Czechoslovakia's then Minister of National Defense, Bohumír Lomský: "Each use of nuclear arms by an aggressor will be answered with a joint nuclear offensive using all the means of the Warsaw Pact countries, on the whole depth and aiming at all targets of the enemy coalition." (3) NATO forces of the period would have been extremely hard pressed to stop a major Warsaw Pact offensive without promptly resorting to the use of battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons. (2) Insane as this may sound now, both Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations and doctrine of that period considered "nuclear war-fighting" a perfectly plausible course of action in the event of superpower conflict. Also, in late 1961 strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems had not yet evolved to the point where a nuclear exchange between the superpowers would have necessarily meant the end of the world. Therefore, once fighting broke out, the incentives to use nuclear weapons would have been very compelling, without the restraining certainty of total destruction for both sides.

Players need to carefully consider the implications of nuclear weapons effects when planning and executing their respective strategies and operations. Nuclear-capable platforms/units assume much greater significance as both strike assets and targets. Nuclear fire strikes can be decisive if properly timed and carried out. Massing forces for a breakthrough in the style of 1944-5 Soviet offensives is probably NOT a good idea. Similarly, under nuclear conditions, traditional multi-layered mobile defense-in-depth can almost always be penetrated at times and places of the attacker's choosing. Use of cover and concealment and attention to reconnaissance increase in importance. Indeed, many unknowns exist - no one has ever fought a full-scale war with a wide array of battlefield, tactical, and theater nuclear weapons available to both sides. The scenario may degenerate into a chaotic blood bath. On the hand, clever players may learn to adapt the nuclear battlefield to their advantage. Above all, do not abandon the scenario once nuclear weapons come into use. Be creative, disperse your forces, protect your nuclear-capable assets while trying to locate and eliminate your opponent's. Be aware that armored vehicles are relatively immune from the effects of nuclear weapons - this may be an important consideration when operating in a nuclear environment. The Soviets came up with something they termed the "anti-nuclear maneuver" (protivoiaderniy manevr) in the 1970s involving rapid penetrations deep into the enemy rear, creating multiple, overlapping battlefields within which attacking and defending forces are so intermingled that defensive use of nuclear weapons are effectively obviated. (5) Could that have worked? Try it and find out.

The side effects of using nuclear weapons are severe. Among them:

- Decreases in Theater recon levels immediately after initiation of nuclear strikes (due to EMP effects as well as massive release of dust and smoke). These will slowly increase again as effects dissipate and forces adapt.
- Negative shock effects (simulating overload and paralysis of C3 systems). Again, shock levels will gradually recover.
- Decreases in supply levels, replacement rates, and transport levels (modeling major disruption of LOCs and destruction/diversion of critical resources). Over time, these levels/rates will return to near normal, though more slowly than either Theater recon or shock.
- Progressive increase in pestilence levels (simulating cumulative losses due to radiation sickness as well as from exposure to biological warfare agents). Pestilence levels will plateau and then decrease until they stabilize at a level slightly greater than zero (note that pestilence levels are zero at the beginning of the scenario).

Note that there are NO victory point penalties for using nuclear or chemical weapons. The principle reason for this is that both antagonists fully anticipated and prepared, as best they could, for large-scale use of weapons of mass destruction in the event of open hostilities (as did practically everyone else in the world). Hence, the political consequences of nuclear warfare by both sides tended to cancel each other out; world political opinion had already "discounted" such an eventuality.

Also, you may notice that some attention has been paid to accurately modeling the nuclear weapons and delivery platforms available and deployed during this period (this was only possible thanks to the splendid BioEd utility). Below, please find a list of new/modified equipment types along with the yields and models of nuclear weapons some of them are associated with:

Modified Equipment List

Infantry & Support Troops

(all Common equipment)

ADM (Atomic Demolition Munition) Team: 0.1kT W-7

TADM Team: 0.5kT W-30

Missile Technical Squad

Nuclear Weapon Custodial Team

SAM Technical Squad

Guns & Mortars

8-inch (203.2mm) Howitzer M1 (USA - 1957): 5-10kT W-33

280mm Gun M65 (USA - 1953): 15-20kT W-19

Weapon System	Yield (Warhead/Bomb)	Modified CE	Blast/Contam. Radius
M8 Redstone MRBM (USA-1959)*	1.9, 3.8MT (W-39)	50,000	1
SM-78 Jupiter IRBM (USA-1959)+	1.44MT (W-49)	36,000	1
SM-75 Thor IRBM (USA/UK-1959)+	1.44MT (W-49)	36,000	1
M35/M50 Honest John SSM (USA-1952)	2-40kT (W-7); 1, 2, 12, 20, 40kT (W-31 boosted fission)	5,000	0
M2 Corporal (USA - 1953)*	2-40kT (W-7)	10,000	0
M4 Lacrosse (USA-1959)	1.7, 10kT (W-40 fission)	2,500	0
TM-61 Matador SSM (USA-1955)*	6-120kT (W-5)	10,417	0
TM-76 Mace (USA-1959)*	70kT-1.45MT (W-28 TN)	13,889 36,000	0
Canberra B(I)8	8-61kT MK-7 or 15kT "Red Beard"	3,750	0
A-3 Skywarrior	8,19,22,30,31,61kT MK-7	7,500	0
A-4 Skyhawk	70kT (Y3), 350kT (Y2) MK-28	10,417	0
B-47 Stratojet		50,000	
B-52 Stratofortress	3-4MT (Mk-39)	50,000	1
F-84F	8,19,22,30,31,61kT (MK-7)	7,500	0
F-100D	MK-7, MK-38, or MK-43 nuclear bomb; Mk 7, Mk 28 EX, Mk 28 RE, Mk 43, TX-43, and TX-43 X1	10,417	0
F-101C	1MT? MK-7	10,417	0
F-105B/D	Mk 28 or a Mk 43	13,889	0
R-11 Zemlya (SS-1b SCUD-A) SSM (USSR-1955)	50kT (RDS-4)	7,003	0
3R-1/3R-2 (FROG-1/2) SSM (USSR-1955)	10, 20, 25kT (RDS-2)	5,000	0
R-9 Luna-2 (FROG-3) SSM (USSR-1959)	20, 25kT (RDS-2)	5,252	0
R-11M Zemlya (SS-1c SCUD-B) SSM (USSR-1960)	70kT (RDS-4)	8,750	0
R-5M Pobeda (SS-3 Shyster 8K51) MRBM (USSR-1955)*	40, 80-300kT (RDS-4)	9,132	0
R-12 (SS-4 Sandal 8K63) MRBM (USSR-1959)+	1-1.3, 2-2.3MT (RDS-6)	32,500	1
R-14 (SS-5 Slean 8K65) MRBM (USSR-1961)+	1, 2-2.3MT (RDS-6)	41,667	1
S-35 Proygress	800kT RDS-6 (350kT	25,000	1

(SSC-1a Shaddock) SSM (USSR-1961) *	RDS-4)		
Il-28 Beagle		10,417	0
Su-7B Fitter		5,000	0
Tu-16 Badger	1MT (RDS-6)	27,778	1

I used the following rule-set and assumptions to model nuclear attack strengths in ACOW:

Yield	Original CE	Modified CE	Divisor
4MT	1,000,000	50,000	20
3.8MT	950,000	50,000	19
1.9MT	475,000	39,583	12
1MT	250,000	27,778	9
500kT	125,000	20,833	6
250kT	62,500	13,889	4.5
125kT	31,250	10,417	3
42kT	10,500	7,000	1.5
21kT	5,250	5,250	1

Where Yield = official published yield; Original CE = original "Conventional Equivalent" attack strength; and Modified CE = "Conventional Equivalent" attack strength modified to correct ACoW nuclear effect scaling bug (described below).

Note that nuclear attack strengths for yields below about 21kT remain unchanged.

Rockets & Missiles

M8/PGM-11A Redstone MRBM (USA - 1959)*: 325km; 1.9(Y1?), 3.8MT W-39; CEP = 0.3km

SM-78/PGM-19 Jupiter IRBM (USA - 1959)+: 2,400km; 1.44MT W-49; CEP = 1.8km (1.5km, 0.81 nautical miles in tests)

SM-75/PGM-17 Thor IRBM (USA/UK - 1959)+: 2,400km; 1.44MT W-49; CEP = 3.2km (0.3+km)

M35/M50 Honest John SSM (USA - 1952): 20km; 2-40kT W-7;

1,2,12,20,40kT W-31 boosted fission; CEP =

M2 Corporal (USA - 1953)*: 138km; 2-40kT W-7; x15 Trucks; CEP =

M4 Lacrosse (USA - 1959): 19km; 1.7, 10kT W-40 fission; CEP =

TM-61/MGM-1 Matador SSM (USA - 1955)*: 1,100km; 6-120kT W-5; CEP = 1,600-2,700ft.

TM-76/MGM-13 Mace (USA - 1959)*: 2,200km; 70kT-1.45MT W-28 TN; CEP =

R-2 Dvoika (SS-2 Sibling 8K38) SSM (USSR - 1952): 600km; HE; CEP =

R-11 Zemlya (SS-1b SCUD-A) SSM (USSR - 1955): 130km; 50kT RDS-4; CEP = 4km

3R-1/3R-2 (FROG-1/2) SSM (USSR - 1955): 32km; 10, 20, 25kT RDS-2; CEP =

R-9 Luna-2 (FROG-3) SSM (USSR - 1959): 40km; 20, 25kT RDS-2; CEP =

R-11M Zemlya (SS-1c SCUD-B) SSM (USSR - 1960): 280km; 70kT RDS-4;
CEP = 0.9km
R-5M Pobeda (SS-3 Shyster 8K51) MRBM (USSR - 1955)*: 1,200km;
40kT (80-300kT) RDS-4; CEP = 1.25-5km
R-12 (SS-4 Sandal 8K63) MRBM (USSR - 1959)+: 2,000km; 1-1.3, 2-
2.3MT RDS-6; CEP = 2.4km (1.5-5km)
R-14 (SS-5 Slean 8K65) MRBM (USSR - 1961)+: 3,200-3,700km or
4,500km; 1MT, 2-2.3MT RDS-6; CEP = 0.9-1.9km
S-35 (SSC-1a Shaddock) SSM (USSR - 1961)*: 400km; 800kT RDS-6
(350kT RDS-4); CEP = 3km

* - Fixed equipment, used in units with "mobile" symbol (Missile artillery). When such a unit is moved, its fixed equipment is lost. On hand replacements will eventually replenish the unit's lost equipment once it reaches a new position. Note that the unit will be unable to launch nuclear attacks until at least 1 piece of this fixed equipment is replaced. This simulates the lengthy set-up times to ready certain early tactical ballistic missile systems for launch (e.g., U.S. Redstone and Corporal, Soviet R-5M).

+ - Fixed equipment, used in units with "immobile" symbol (Fixed artillery). Such units cannot move at all. This simulates weapons systems that were only launched from completely fixed installations such as silos. Note that launching nuclear attacks from such units will almost always end your turn (due to the fact that these units have a zero movement allowance).

Many of these early missile systems were cumbersome to deploy, with rather primitive guidance systems, poor accuracy, and serious reliability problems. They would probably have been marginally effective in a conventional role and were really only considered battlefield-, tactical-, or theater-level nuclear delivery vehicles. To model such limitations, units equipped with these weapons systems have lower proficiency and begin the game with reduced readiness levels compared to other units of the same nationality.

Anti-Aircraft Weapons

V-75 Dvina (SA-2) SAM (Soviet Union - 1957): Increased AA value from 6 to 9
S-125 Neva (SA-3) SAM (Soviet Union - 1961): Increased AA value from 6 to 9
Bloodhound Mk 1 SAM (United Kingdom - 1958): Increased AA value from 5 to 7
MIM-24A Nike-Hercules SAM (United States - 1950's): Increased AA value from 6 to 9
MIM-23A HAWK SAM (United States - 1960's): Increased AA value from 8 to 11

AA values for the above SAMs were increased by approximately 50% to reflect their novelty and the lack of widespread countermeasures against them. In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates that ACoW may be understating the effectiveness of AA weapons in general.

Fixed Wing Aircraft

Canberra: 8-61kT MK-7 or 15kT "Red Beard"

A-3 Skywarrior: 8,19,22,30,31,61kT MK-7

A-4 Skyhawk: 70kT (Y3), 350kT (Y2) MK-28

B-47 Stratojet:

B-52 Stratofortress: up to 4 large TN bombs

F-84F: 8,19,22,30,31,61kT MK-7

F-100D: MK-7, MK-38, or MK-43 nuclear bomb; Mk 7, Mk 28 EX, Mk 28 RE, Mk 43, TX-43, and TX-43 X1, with yields ranging from a kiloton to nearly ten megatons

F-101C: 1MT? MK-7

F-105B/D: Mk 28 or a Mk 43. However, an Mk 61 could be carried underneath the left or right inboard underwing pylon and a Mk 57 or a Mk 61 could be carried underneath the centerline pylon

Note: All of the above information is from open source and de-classified materials.

The significant modification to ACoW's original scale for nuclear attack strengths is necessitated by a program bug which causes nuclear blast and contamination radii to remain constant, in hex terms, regardless of map scale. (Credit belongs to Ben Turner for discovering this bug.) Empirical testing determined that the "original scale" used to estimate nuclear weapons blast and contamination effects seems most consistent with 5km/hex. This means that in a game at 15km/hex, unmodified nuclear weapons will produce blast and contamination radii about 3 times wider than they should be. In practice, this effect is more pronounced the higher the yield of the weapon. The bug results in dramatic overstatement of the effects of nuclear weapons as map scales increase above 5km/hex.

Note that lethality effects of nuclear weapons do seem to vary with map scale. Thus, this modification will reduce the lethality of higher-yield nuclear weapons in the interest of producing much more accurate blast and radiation effects. Given that attack strengths for yields below 21kT remain unaffected by this modification, and that many nuclear weapons fielded by both sides during this period had yields below 21kT, the overall effect to game play and results should not be significant.

The attrition divider has been set to 7 (from the default value of 10, theoretically causing combat to be about 30% more lethal), in order to partially compensate for the attenuated nuclear attack strengths of higher-yield weapons.

LEAD-UP TO WAR

Soviet military theorists of the time were very concerned with "the initial period of war." The common wisdom held that whichever side achieved the initiative, especially in employment of nuclear weapons, possessed a decisive advantage on the battlefield. Both sides prepared and prepared for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against and by the other. In this scenario the exact timing and circumstances of the outbreak of general war is not known. Actions by either side to increase their military readiness (alert/mobilization) also have the effect of ratcheting up tension, making the initiation of hostilities more likely. Additional random events beyond the control of either Theater Commander will influence the likelihood that general war breaks out. Finally, one or both sides may be authorized to launch nuclear attacks immediately upon or shortly after the outbreak of war (pay very close attention to your SITUATION BRIEFING at the beginning of each turn to learn whether and how many nuclear attacks have been authorized).

The Event Engine Variable (EEV) is used to model the tension level in the period leading up to the outbreak of war. Certain random events will increment (or, in the case of one event, decrement) the EEV by a specific amount until it reaches an initial threshold. At that point a probability exists that the Open Fire event will be triggered - should the Open Fire event NOT be triggered the EEV will continue to increment until a 2nd threshold is reached, at which point general war will break out (with 100% certainty).

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC AND GIUK GAP

Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities naval battles for control of the Atlantic and GIUK Gap will commence. NATO has a better chance of winning these battles but suffers more adverse effects if it loses. In the event of a NATO naval victory, reinforcements in the form of a carrier battle group, air wing, and Marine Expeditionary Force may arrive within several days. In the event of a Soviet naval victory, reinforcements, replacements, and additional sea transport assets due to arrive from the U.S. may be cancelled.

AUSTRIA

Austria begins the game as a neutral, its territory an exclusion zone, and its armed forces in garrison. Once general war breaks out, two potential courses of action can result in Austria becoming involved in hostilities (on the NATO side):

1. Austria may permit NATO forces on its territory in the first few days after the 'Open fire' event. This removes exclusion zone 1 and triggers the eventual mobilization of Austrian armed forces. Soviet forces are free to attack Austria without penalty at that point.
2. Soviet Defense Council may order the invasion of Austria. This decision will occur within 4 days of the outbreak of general war. Exclusion zone 1 is removed and Austrian mobilization is

triggered. NATO forces may enter Austrian territory without penalty.

Neither course of action may end up occurring, in which case Austria remains neutral.

Note that neither player will be given a Theater Option to "invade Austria." This decision is assumed to be made at the highest political level - as Theater Commanders, players simply obey the orders they see in the NEWS SUMMARY display.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia also begins the game as a neutral, its territory an exclusion zone. There exists a probability that Yugoslavia will grant Soviet forces permission to transit its territory, in order to invade Italy via the 'Gorizia Gap.' This transit right, which manifests itself as the removal of Exclusion Zone 2 in the game, can be triggered by:

1. Outbreak of war,
2. Austrian decision to permit NATO forces on its territory, or
3. Soviet Defense Council order to invade Austria.

Note that Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija - JNA) forces are permanently on Garrison orders.

REFUGEES AND GUERRILLAS

Immediately following the commencement of hostilities civilians will begin to flee West German cities close to the Inner German Border. This will result in refugee effects (more pronounced and persistent on the NATO side) centered on the major cities closest to the IGB:

Hamburg
Hanover
Frankfurt am Main
Nürnberg
München

The advance of Soviet forces will trigger civilian evacuations of metropolitan areas deeper inside West Germany as well as in Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, and eastern France.

Both sides will suffer guerrilla effects at varying times after general war breaks out. Guerrilla activity will intensify significantly in the Warsaw Pact states if war lasts longer than about 3-4 weeks after the outbreak of hostilities.

A NOTE ON EVENTS AND NEWS

Events are extremely important in this scenario, particularly during the "Cease Fire" period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities.

Players are advised to pay very close attention to the NEWS SUMMARY display as information shown there may have a decisive influence on the course of the scenario. However, be aware that many significant events will NOT generate news strings (these have been suppressed using the "debug" prefix - they can be viewed by running ACOW in "uberdude" mode). An attempt was made to actively "manage" news in this scenario - some events whose existence and/or consequences would not reasonably be known to both sides have had their news strings suppressed. For example, the event representing the Soviet Defense Council's decision to order mass nuclear and chemical strikes does not generate a news string in the New Summary display. Is it reasonable to assume that SACEUR (the NATO Player) would learn about this on the front page of the International Herald Tribune?

[The optimal solution would be for ACOW to support "force-specific news strings;" i.e., the ability to specify which side gets to see each news string: Force 1, Force 2, or both.]

As a consequence, players must pay very close attention to the SITUATION BRIEFING at the beginning of each turn - it may contain the only information visible to them to indicate critically important scenario events. To continue the example above, since the Soviet nuclear authorization event does not generate a visible news string, the only indication a Soviet player will have that nuclear attacks have been authorized will be the "Our nuclear weapon stockpile: x/x" entry in the "Special Weapons" section of the SITUATION BRIEFING.

THEATER COMMANDERS

The NATO Player represents SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) General L.Norstad (USAF). The SOVETSKAIA ARMIYA Player represents Commander-in-Chief of GSVG (Western Strategic Direction in wartime) Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S.Konev.

SOME UNIT ABBREVIATIONS

SOVETSKAIA ARMIYA (Soviet Army)

abr	ARTILLERIYSKAYA BRIGADA	Artillery Brigade
ad	ARTILLERIYSKAYA DIVIZIYA	Artillery Division
BAD	bombardirovotshnaia aviatsionnaia diviziia	Bomber Aviation Division
gv.gabr	GVARDEYSKAYA GAUBICHNAYA ARTILLERIYSKAYA BRIGADA	Guards Howitzer Brigade
IAP	istrebitel'naia aviatsionnaia polk	Fighter Aviation Regiment
isapbr	INZhENERNO-SAPERNAYA BRIGADA	Engineer-Sapper Brigade
msd	motostrelkovaia diviziia	Motor-Rifle Division
OA	OBShCHEVOISKOVAYA ARMIYA	Combined-Arms Army
pmp	PONTONNO-MOSTOVOY POLK	Pontoon-Bridging Regiment
pdb	PEREPRAVOCHNO-DESANTNYY BATAL'ION	Assault-Crossing Battalion
rbr	RAKETNAYA BRIGADA	Rocket Brigade
td	tankovaia diviziia	Tank Division
ttb	TYazhELAYa tankovaia diviziia	Heavy-Tank Division
zrkbr	ZENITNAYA RAKETNAYA BRIGADA	Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade
...		

to be completed...

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(<http://www.vfw.org/magazine/feb98/contents.shtml>)

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As much research as has gone into this scenario, there remain significant 'gray areas.' I am, of course, responsible for all inaccuracies and omissions. Any feedback or constructive criticism would thus be gratefully accepted and most appreciated.

Finally, this scenario is dedicated to the millions of mostly anonymous heroes who served during the Cold War. We're still here because of their sacrifices.

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The End!